In this paper, we present a new class of attacks against an anonymous communication protocol, originally presented in ACNS 2008. The protocol itself was proposed as an improved version of ModOnions, which exploits universal re-encryption in order to avoid replay attacks. However, ModOnions allowed the detour attack, introduced by Danezis to re-route ModOnions to attackers in such a way that the entire path is revealed. The ACNS 2008 proposal addressed this by using a more complicated key management scheme. The revised protocol is immune to detour attacks. We show, however, that the ModOnion construction is highly malleable and this property can be exploited in order to redirect ModOnions. Our attacks require detailed probing and are less efficient than the detour attack, but they can nevertheless recover the full onion path while avoiding detection and investigation. Motivated by this, we present modifications to the ModOnion protocol that dramatically reduce the malleability of the encryption primitive. It addresses the class of attacks we present and it makes other attacks difficult to formulate.
Introduction
Mix networks have been a popular scheme for anonymous communication since their introduction by Chaum [1] . The basics of the design are that messages are protected by a layered ("onion") encryption, with each mix in the path removing a layer of encryption and shuffling a batch of incoming messages before forwarding them onwards. This way, each mix only knows its predecessor and successor in the forwarding path of a message transmitted through the mix, and an outside observer cannot link inputs of the mix to the outputs due to encryption.
The idea of mixes is very appealing and became the basic component of major anonymous communication protocols. However, despite of the importance of the problem, we are still far away from providing an ultimate solution that would provide a satisfactory resilience to attempts of breaking anonymity. The main reason is that in a practical setting an adversary has many other attack possibilities than merely observing the incoming and outcoming messages of a mix. This includes issues such as traffic analysis (static and dynamic) as well as active attacks where an adversary may inject messages or modify them. So far, research on anonymous communication protocols is a step-by-step advance, where protocol proposals (dealing with certain classes of problems) are followed by new attack methods. Replay attack, ModOnions and detour attacks. Two rogue mixes can carry out a replay attack, where one mix will re-send one or more copy of a message, and the other look for duplicate incoming messages. This way the two mixes can detect that they are on the same forwarding paths even if they are separated by many honest mixes. The traditional defense to this attack is to have each mix look for and discard message duplicates [2] , requiring the mixes to maintain state. Note that most of anonymous routing protocols are not immune against replay attack. Even the most popular TOR protocol (introduced in [3] ) can be affected by elaborated forms of reply attack as reported in [4] . TOR is quite different from the regular Onion Routing and to protect integrity of a message it uses enumerating packages and labeling streams. Such an approach protects to some extent from reply attacks, however makes TOR vulnerable to different statistical attacks. The fact remains, however, that TOR is the most secure implemented solution. ModOnions [5] take an alternate approach, using Universal Re-Encryption (URE) [6] to re-randomize the messages ("onions"), such that duplicate copies of an onion cannot be linked. Re-encryption of such onions is possible, since instead of a single onion with a message hidden at each "layer" of the onion, there is a group of onions to be processed together, each encoding a different routing information for a path. When processed properly, each node on the path gets information from one of these onions and re-randomizes the rest. Last not least, ModOnions can be signed by some intermediate servers (for instance in order to prevent spam) and the signatures can be re-encrypted while processing [7] .
ModOnions addressed the replay attacks, but it turned out that they are susceptible to the detour attack [8] , where a ModOnion is redirected to go back to the attacker after each routing step, and a mix is used as a decryption oracle. Klonowski et al. presented a defense against the detour attacks by modifying the key management scheme and using different keys for the final decryption [9] .
Results
New attacks. We show that the improved scheme presented in [9] is still vulnerable to redirection attacks that allow the recovery of the forwarding path. Our first attack uses the fact that a form of oracle decryption is still possible even in the modified scheme. It is no longer possible for an attacker to learn the next hop in a path, but he can verify a guess of a forwarding path if he controls both the first and last node. The number of guesses depends on the size of the network and the length of the forwarding paths; the attack is feasible for a medium-sized network of 50 nodes using paths of length 5, but quickly becomes impractical for larger parameters.
Our second attack relies on malleability of the URE scheme, which makes it possible for an attacker to modify the encrypted plaintext of a message without knowing the key under which it is encrypted. This makes it possible to selectively modify an onion and use probes to recover its structure and learn the next hop, all while avoiding detection. This attack requires many fewer probes and is practical for most network sizes. Patches. Using previous observations we propose a new extension to ModOnions that drastically limits the malleability of the scheme such that any modification to the plaintext will be detected with high probability. This makes the odds of success of our attacks negligible, as a large number of probes must all be modified in such a way as to escape detection. By introducing this integrity check into the ModOnion protocol, our extension should make the design of new attacks more difficult as well.
ModOnions Protocol from [9]
In this section we recall the improved version of the ModOnions protocol (Onion Routing with Universal Re-Encryption) from [9] . This protocol uses as a building block an extension of Universal Re-Encryption. At first let us recall details and properties of Universal Re-Encryption from [6] .
Universal Re-Encryption
Universal Re-Encryption is based on the ElGamal encryption scheme. Construction of this scheme is based on a cyclic group G, where discrete logarithm and DDH problems are hard. Namely, let p, q be prime numbers such that The ElGamal scheme is a probabilistic one: the same message encrypted for the second time yields a different ciphertext with overwhelming probability. Moreover, given two ciphertexts, it seems to be infeasible in practice to say whether they have been encrypted under the same key (unless, of course, the decryption key is given). This property is called key-privacy (see [6] ). ElGamal cryptosystem has yet another important property. Everyone can re-encrypt a ciphertext ( ) α,β and get ( )
chosen at random and y is the public key user for encryption. Moreover, without the decryption key it is infeasible to find that ( ) α,β and ( ) α',β' correspond to the same plaintext.
In [6] Golle et al. proposed a slightly modified version of this scheme that is called universal re-encryption scheme or URE for short. It consists of the following procedures:
Setup: A generator g of a cyclic group G of prime order is chosen, where discrete logarithm problem is hard and DDH assumption holds. Then G and g are published.
Key generation: Alice chooses a private key x at random; then the corresponding public key y is computed as ( )
, which is a ciphertext of the same plaintext. since URE is a probabilistic encryption scheme. It is obvious that it still is a correct URE ciphertext for the "reduced" decryption key ∑ = λ 2 i i x , and therefore it also can be re-encrypted as it was described above.
Extension of Universal Re-Encryption
( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
Description of ModOnions Protocol from [9]
The core idea of the protocol introduced in [9] 
where t is a current time.
Note that:
λ is a static parameter of the protocol, E denotes encryption scheme with properties described in [5] [9], for each block one of destination keys i d is used and only once; moreover, it is the destination key of the final recipient of the information stored in the block. Routing. When a server s gets Modified ModOnion, the following steps of the protocol are executed:
1. Server s copies all blocks of a ModOnion. Then it decrypts all blocks with its private destination key. 2. If every previous server on the path is honest, then after decryption exactly one of the blocks contains a correct message. Then the message is delivered. Case 3: the result of decryption for all blocks is meaningless. Then the investigation procedure is launched. Investigation procedure. This is a part of the protocol launched by the node detecting dishonest behavior of other nodes. In this procedure consecutive nodes from the path prove correct processing of the ModOnion. It is assumed that malicious node, once caught is permanently excluded from the protocol. A detailed description can be found in [5] .
Attacks on the ModOnions Protocol from [9]

Attack 1: Guessing the Path
The modification to the ModOnions ensured that a router no longer acts as a decryption oracle for the destination key, thus making it impossible to carry out the detour attack. However, the router still acts as a decryption oracle for the transport key. This lets the attacker verify a guess for the path the onion will take. Suppose that an onion is sent to 6 s along a path However, to test multiple guesses, onions would need to be replayed and the destination would get multiple copies of the same message, launching an investigation. When using the decryption oracles, no investigation will be started. 
Attack 2: The Two-hop Attack
Our second attack exploits the fact that URE allows an attacker to replace the plaintext of a message without knowing the encryption key as well as the plaintext removed. So, for example, given a block s , and so on.
Defense: Context-Sensitive Encryption Based on Tagged Encryption
As it was shown so far a core problem that is exploited by all the attacks on ModOnions is that the onion construction is highly malleable: an attacker can make extensive modifications to the encrypted onion and still produce a valid result. To defend against them, we must reduce or eliminate this ability. In the conference version of this paper ([10]) we showed that context-sensitive encryption scheme, i.e. the encryption in which all the keys depends on the path of the onion, allows to prevent any leakeage of the information about the path. The only problem with the encryption construction proposed is time and complexity of the decryption phase. Namely, during the decryption procedure a node needs to perform many trial decryptions in order to find a proper destination key. Here we propose the improvement of the context-sensitive encryption method that allows to avoid this problem. In this paper we use a notion of tag non-malleability, as defined by MacKenzie et al. [11] . This notion associates a tag with a ciphertext and ensures that no modifications may be made to the tag while retaining a meaningful message. We use this construction to embed the message path (or fragments thereof) into a tag. Therefore, however the adversary tampers with the message, the tags ensure that the message traverses the intended path, eliminating the possibility of the above and other attacks. We first present MacKenzie et al.'s construction of a tag non-malleable scheme and its extensions to support universal re-encryption and then describe an updated context sensitive encryption protocol that uses it. s are the identifiers of the nodes preceding and following i s in the onion path. Function F should have all properties of a secure hash function except that its range is very small. As F we can for instance a hash function with its values truncated to a few bits.
Tagged encryption
Tagged encryption augments standard public-key encryption definition to include a tag in the encryption and decryption operations. A tagged ciphertext can only be decrypted with the correct tag; otherwise, the decryption returns an error.
Key generation: as in standard public-key encryption, key generation produces a public and a secret key:
Encryption takes an extra tag parameter t:
Decryption takes the same parameter t:
The scheme should satisfy the following conditions:
The formal security definition of tag non-malleability parallels the simulation-based non-malleability definition, with the difference that queries with the same tag are forbidden. For more details, see [11] . MacKenzie et al. provide a construction based on Cramer-Shoup scheme that will be the foundation of our new protocol: 
is the public key.
Then the cumulative encryption (using n public keys) and n tags 1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0   ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  dec We can use these primitive to wrap an onion in n layers of encryption and unwrap them one-by-one at each router.
Context-Sensitive Tagged Onion Construction
Preliminaries. Given a group q G of order q where the DDH assumption holds, a generator g ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , Onion Construction. The construction of the context-sensitive tagged onion is similar to the ModOnion construction, but it uses tags and the context-sensitive keys to keep track of the path. Suppose a node 0 s wishes to send a message to 5 s through the following a path:
. We assume that it has the public keys for all routers of this path. The first block of the onion is:
The next block would be:
Proceeding in this manner, the last block will have the form: 
Forwarding of the onions proceeds in a similar fashion as before, except that context-sensitive keys are used and the tag verification needs to be performed. Thus when node i s receives the onion, then 1. i s copies the onion and decrypts all the blocks of the copy with the destination key * i sk to find out the one that decrypts correctly and is consistent with the tag. Namely, for each block of the form ( ) 
Security Analysis of the Modified ModOnion Scheme
Defending against the Two-Hop Attack. The two-hop attack makes extensive use of modifying the onion contents. However now, thanks to the tagged based encryption, any deviation from the original path is detected during the tag verification. The attacker can still replace the plaintext of the message (this part is malleable), but cannot modify the tag. Thus, during an unsuccessful probe, 2 s would get an onion with the block: When the onion is sent to 2 s , it will be forwarded along the path This attack is slower than the (already slow) path guessing attack. In our particular case Possibility to parallelize this process is limited due to the fact that every probe must pass through 2 s first, limiting the rate that can be used without arousing suspicion. If the size of the network is such that the attack is still practical, increasing the path length can easily eliminate it.
Possibility of Tagging Attacks. The modified construction of onions and the context-sensitive encryption still potentially allow the adversary to replace the plaintext (the address of the next server or the message) in a single block or put something in the place of the random block. To some extent, this can be useful for a tagging attack. Let us consider the following scenario: an onion gets to some corrupted node i s . This node wants to add a special tag, so that if this onion arrives at another node controlled by the adversary, then he will be able to recognize this event. There are two ways in which the adversary may try to achieve that goal. According to the first method, i s can copy some block of the onion, change the original plaintext there into some "tag" message, blind the ciphertext with some additional key x' and use it as the random block created by himself. The adversary will be able to recognize the tag if and only if the block used is a block addressed to a node under control of the adversary. This occurs with probability f, where f is the fraction of nodes controlled by the adversary in the network. If the adversary replaces some other blocks with the blocks constructed as above, then the chance to detect a tag may increase at most λ times, where λ is the number of blocks. So, the probability remains small for the case when f is reasonable. However, if the tag is not recognized by some adversary node, then it will be detected that some block is missing and an investigation will be started. According to the second method, the adversary creates a ciphertext that encodes some "tag" by using the public keys of arbitrarily chosen nodes and some blinding factor x' and replaces some original block with this ciphertext. In this case tagging remains undetected by honest nodes as long as the tag is inserted in the random block created by i s . The tag can be read by an adversary node only if the path for the tag is guessed correctly. If this path has length k, then this probability equals
, where f is the fraction of nodes controlled by the adversary and N is the overall number of nodes. The adversary may increase this probability by replacing more blocks by the blocks with tags. However, in most cases the tags are undetected, but the block removed will be found missing leading to an investigation.
Countermeasures against Tagging Attacks. As you could see in the previous section, the risk of the successful tagging attack is limited. Moreover only the first method of tagging attacks presented above poses a serious threat. Thus, we concentrate on preventing a node from inserting any information in the random block. For this purpose we need a public key P. Peculiarity of this public key is that it has no owner holding the corresponding private key. We also assume that each message contains information on sending time and that each message will be delivered in time T -otherwise we talk about an irregularity that has to be investigated. The protocol may look as follows:
• instead of a random block a node should construct a ciphertext of nil using public key P, The proof is given by presenting the random exponent used for creating the ciphertext of nil. The second method requires that a node either should store the random exponents used, or should create them in a pseudorandom way so that the generator can be re-run in order to re-compute the output of the generator. Note that in the proposed solution, each node is required to retain only a very small amount of data for a short time, instead of whole traffic processed by particular node.
Conclusions
We presented two new types of attacks on the ModOnions protocol showing that, despite modifications in [9] , the protocol is still insecure against more sophisticated attacks. However, we introduce a patch that successfully defends against these new attacks without providing any new information to intermediate nodes. Our main design feature is to use encryption mode that depends on information known to the nodes anyway (that is, the previous and the next nodes on the routing path). Note that any new information would endanger the scheme due to replay attacks.
The main remaining challenge seems to be the tagging attack. The countermeasure proposed is quite dependable, but requires storing temporarily some data by the nodes processing messages.
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